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Franchising: Probable Impact of the
New Federal Trade Commission Rule
The Federal Trade Commission recently published a rule entitled
Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures.' This rule, as its title suggests, generally
requires disclosure, in an offering circular, of material information
concerning the franchise being promoted.2 In support of the rule, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC; Commission) has conducted the most
searching and significant study of the character of franchising and its
abuses yet undertaken.3
The study reveals that the currently unregulated offering and sale
system of franchises is riddled with abuse by franchisors. Prior attempts to
correct this abuse of the system through franchise litigation relying on
common law fraud, federal antitrust, and securities law theories, have
proven only marginally helpful. The Commission has thus concluded that
prophylactic measures at a national level are necessary.
In order to assess the probable impact of the Rule upon franchisee-
franchisor litigation, this Comment will take up three topics. First, the
practical and legal character of the franchise relationship as found by the
Commission will be examined. Second, although the Commission urges
that the courts recognize an implied private right of action under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,4 there are significant substantive
and procedural difficulties with this remedy. These will be identified by
testing the remedy against those available to investors under the federal
securities laws.5 Third, this Comment will focus upon the reason behind
judicial disfavor of securities antifraud claims in the context of franchise
litigation. Because the Commission's findings confirm that the courts'
reasoning is without factual foundation, this Comment will suggest a test
that recognizes the economic realities of franchising as a security.
I. DISCLOSURE AS DETERRENCE: IMPACT UPON FRANCHISOR
ABUSE AT THE POINT OF SALE
A. Franchising
Recognizing that franchising takes many forms, the Commission
1. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportuni-
ty Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436 [hereinafter cited as
Disclosure Requirements].
2. Id. at 59,614 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1).
3. The Commission's record comprises over 30,000 pages. Statement of Basis and Purpose
Relating to Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business
Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Basis and
Purpose].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1971).
5. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78hh (1976).
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defined it simply as "a method of doing business or a method of
distribution."6 But franchising is not so mutable that its elements never
have continuity. Thus, it might be further defined as a device whereby one
purchases the right to promote a product, process, or service directly to
consumers in exchange for which the purchaser virtually relinquishes
control over his capital investment.7
Franchises may be divided into two classes: conventional and
unconventional. In the conventional form, the franchisee purchases the
use of the franchisor's name and services and, additionally, invests in real
estate, fixtures, equipment, and inventory. Generally, the consumer comes
to the franchisee's place of business, although some conventional
franchises are mobile service businesses. Typical examples of conventional
franchises are fast-food shops, tax return preparation offices, candy shops,
and florist shops. Virtually any product or service used by the public is a
candidate for franchising.
The unconventional franchise, on the other hand, generally requires a
negligible capital investment beyond the franchise fee. The franchisee
often is little more than a peddler. The appeal of the unconventional
franchise is that, by recruiting others to the plan, the franchisee may earn a
commission or "override" on all sales made by his recruits. Mathematical-
ly, the returns from this system can be tremendous. The unconventional
franchises have been generally labelled as pyramid sales plans, referral
schemes, and founders' contracts
Whatever form the franchise takes, however, marketing always
follows roughly the same pattern. Conventional franchise prospects are
initially contacted through advertising, direct mailings, trade shows or
franchise brokers.9 Unconventional franchisors rely almost exclusively on
contacts between existing franchisees and the public.10
Following the initial contact, the prospect is generally supplied with a
franchise package containing promotional material, and frequently
contacted personally by an employee of the franchisor. If the prospect
shows interest, the franchisor frequently employs a "headhunter" to close
the deal. This independent contractor works on commission for every
franchise sold, 1 and uniformly employs a hard-sell technique. He extolls
the virtues of independence enjoyed by franchisees, describes fantastic
profit potentials, introduces the prospect to selected "friendly"
franchisees-some of whom have received kickbacks from the franchisor
6. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,621.
7. See Goodwin, The Name of The Franchising Game Is: The Franchise Fee, The Celebrity or
Basic Operations, 25 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1970); Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,701.
8. Discussed in detail at note 115 and accompanying text infra.
9. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,623.
10. See note 115 and accompanying text infra.
11. The author of this Comment has personal knowledge of one case in which the headhunter
received one-third of the initial franchise fee for every sale closed.
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for their cooperation-and generally excites the prospect's greed in every
conceivable manner.
12
After the prospect has orally committed himself, the franchisor
ordinarily requires him to produce a credit report and a statement of net
worth satisfactory to the franchisor. The franchisor may purport to
conduct an investigation to determine if the prospect can meet its
"standards."
After a satisfactory report is obtained, the conventional franchisee is
presented with a skillfully drafted agreement delineating the entire
relationship of the parties. The document often covers twenty pages or
more,13 but despite its complexity, less than one-half of all franchisees seek
legal advice before signing.'
4
Although the agreement varies somewhat between franchisors, the
basic provisions are uniform.' 5 The franchisee agrees to pay an initial fee,
in consideration of which the franchisor grants the use of a trademark or
process. In consideration of certain services to be performed by the
franchisor, the franchisee covenants to (1) pay royalty and advertising fees
based upon a percentage of gross income; (2) set up and maintain his
premises to the specifications of the franchisor; (3) purchase goods only as
specified by the franchisor; (4) provide monthly, quarterly, semi-annual,
and annual statements of income and expenses; (5) provide an audited
annual balance sheet; (6) maintain insurance coverage as required by the
franchisor; and (7) grant the franchisor first refusal if he wishes to sell the
business, or, if the franchisor declines to repurchase, sell only to buyers
whom the franchisor accepts as satisfactory. Generally, the agreement
provides that the franchisor may seek injunctive relief against the
franchisee if any provision is breached, but requires that the franchisee
submit any dispute to arbitration.
The franchisor covenants to (1) provide training for the franchisee, at
the franchisee's expense; (2) advise and counsel the franchisee; (3) provide
experienced personnel to help the franchisee's opening; and (4) conduct
reasonable advertising and promotional services in the franchisees area.
The agreement may contain a provision granting the franchisee an
exclusive area of operations, and may also contain language to the effect
that the franchisor agrees to use its best efforts to provide wholesale
discounts to the franchisee.
The agreement never alludes to the claims and representations made
12. Numerous examples of these practices appear in the text of the Statement of Basis and
Purpose, supra note 3.
13. Id. at 59,626.
14. Id. at 59,626-27 n.20.
15. The characteristics of the "typical" franchise agreement which follow in the text are derived
from an agreement currently in use and from provisions that appear in the reported cases. For
particularly detailed opinions, see Chapman v. Rudd Paint and Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.
1969); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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by franchisor sales people with respect to "guarantees" of profits or
success. Moreover, the agreement always contains provisions disclaiming
any guarantees and designating the franchisee as an independent
contractor. Merger clauses are universal. Also, the agreement may contain
a provision wherein the franchisee expressly waives liability for any
representations or statements made outside the document.
Although this agreement obligates the franchisor to do almost
nothing, but imposes immense obligations on the franchisee, franchisees
are seldom dissuaded from concluding the sale.' 6 This phenomenon
indicates that the hard sell works, that the prospect is committed to the
arrangement before he sees a contract.
It can no longer be doubted that the franchise agreement is frequently
"one-sided and unfair,"' 7 or that the franchisor wields "tremendous
control" over the franchisee.1 The Commission's report confirms that this
control is not fortuitous, but results from franchisor marketing strategy.
This strategy aims precisely at those who are least able to make informed
decisions-unsophisticated investors.
As the Commission noted:
[I]t was reported that ". . 68 percent of our sample of franchisees did not
own a business prior to their franchised business and half the franchisees had
incomes below $10,000 prior to buying their franchise." This relative lack of
'business experience and low capitalization is quite striking in light of the
nature of franchising-a ". . . highly complex, dynamic and changing area,
with varied sophisticated business, financial and legal techniques and
complications."
Given the complex nature of most franchising operations, it is somewhat
surprising that a group of relatively "unsophisticated" persons enters a field
which requires such a significant degree of business acumen.19
The Commission did not, however, rely upon substantive bargaining
disparities of franchisors and franchisees in support of the Rule.20 It
focused instead upon the "informational imbalance" created by franchisor
marketing strategies. 2'
B. The Rule
Perceiving the problem as one of "informational imbalance," the
Commission has attempted corrective measures that require disclosure of
material facts and prohibit material misrepresentations in the offering and
16. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,626-27.
17. Id. at 59,627 n.22.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 59,625. See also Franchise Legislation: Hearings on S.R. 26 Before the Subcomm, on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1968)
(statement of Jerome Shuman); OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICES CoMMIsSIoN, FRANCIIISING: ALLEGED
ABUSES AND POSSIBLE STATE REMEDIES Rep. No. 111, at 7 (1974); H. BROWN, FRANCIIISINa-
REALITIES & REMEDIES 11 (1st ed. 1973).
20. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,627 n.22.
21. Id. at 59,625.
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sale of franchises.22 The Commission will enforce the Rule under the
authority granted it by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.?2
The Commission has pointedly suggested that an implied private right of
action should be recognized by the courts.24
The Rule requires that the franchisor furnish to the franchisee, before
the sale,25 a single offering circular2 6 that contains the disclosures
mandated by the Rule. Affirmative disclosure is required of the franchisor
in a number of critical areas: (1) the business experience of the franchisor's
management,27 (2) the business history of the franchisor, 28 (3) past and
pending material litigation involving the franchisor or its management, 29
(4) the number of franchise units currently operating, (5) past acquisition
and termination of units by the franchisor,3 (6) audited balance sheets,
income statements, and statements of changes in the franchisor's financial
position, for the preceding three years. 31 The Rule also prohibits the
franchisor from making projections relating to a unit's potential income,
unless "a reasonable basis exists for such representation. 32 Prior to the
closing, the franchisor must, on demand, provide the prospective
franchisee with a document that discloses the informational base upon
which the projection was developed.33
In addition to furnishing the prospective franchisee with this
document and the prospectus, the franchisor must provide a copy of the
agreement itself at least five business days prior to the date the agreement is
to be executed.34 Finally, the franchisor is prohibited from making any
claims or representations, either oral or written, that contradict
information required to be disclosed by the Rule.35
C. Impact of the Rule
The Rule addresses other disclosures and prohibitions, but the
provisions just outlined are most central to the intended purpose of
22. Franchisee complaints on the record include material omissions and misrepresentations, as
well as what the Commission described as "conduct wherein the franchise offering itself was
fraudulent." Id. This apparently means that the seller was never engaged in business at all, but merely
practiced flimflam that took the form of a franchise offering.
23. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1); see 15 U.S.C. §45 (1976).
24. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,723.
25. Disclosure Requirements, supra note 1, at 59,620 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(g) &
(o)).
26. Id. at 59,617 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(21)).
27. Id. at 59,614-15 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(aX2)).
28. Id. at 59,615 (to be codifid in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(aX3)).
29. Id. (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.l(a)(4)).
30. Id. at 59,616 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(aXI6)).
31. Id. at 59,616-17 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(20)).
32. Id. at 59,617 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(b)(2)).
33. Id(to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.l(b)(3)).
34. Id. at 59,619 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(g)).
35. Id. (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(f)).
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
investor protection. Indeed, a disclosure statement will appear strikingly
similar to the registration statement and prospectus required in an offering
36 iof registered securities. This is hardly a surprising result, given that the
Commission drew heavily upon rules and documents of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and upon the body of federal securities
antifraud case law.3
In short, the central elements of the Rule represent a wholesale
codification of SEC rules and court decisions. This is not fortuitous,
however. In requiring full disclosure, prohibiting misrepresentations, and
urging recognition of a private right of action in the offering and sale of
franchises, the Commission was simply adopting the policy underlying
federal securities law. The Supreme Court in effect presaged the
Commission's objectives when it stated that "[t]he Securities Act of 1933
was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to
protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified
civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.' '
Given the underlying policy objectives of the Commission, and the
similarity between the franchise offering circular and the securities
prospectus, it can be safely predicted that the impact of the Rule at the
point of sale will parallel that of the prospectus in the securities field.
Significantly, the prospectus alone has not extinguished securities fraud.
The prospectus and registration statement are defensive documents, not
selling tools. The prospectus has become a lawyer's weapon, drafted with
intent to avoid civil liability under the Securities Act and common law."
It is probably inevitable that the franchise offering circular will
become much the same type of document. Clearly there is some deterrent
effect in requiring disclosure, but franchisors are even less likely to be
dissuaded from fraud by the prospectus requirement than is the issuer of
securities. There are a number of reasons for this conclusion.
First, unlike the issuer of securities, which cannot commence an
offering until the SEC has approved its registration statement, 0 the
franchisor need not obtain prior review of the franchise offering circular by
the Commission.41 This allows the franchisor greater leverage in drafting a
circular and commencing an offering. Although the Rule requires that the
36. See Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (1976).
37. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3,59,643 n.58 (to be codified in 16 CF.R. §
436.1(a)(4)) (material litigation disclosures); 59,680 n.432 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(20))
(audited financial reports); 59,683 n.455 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(22)) (material changes in
financial position of franchisor); 59,685 n.482, 59,687 nn.500-03, 59,691 n.543 (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 436.1(b)-436.1(d)) (basis for projections of unit income); 59,715-16 (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 436.2(i)) ("affiliated person" defined); and 59,718 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(n))
("materiality" definied).
38. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citations omitted).
39. L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATIO N 262 (temp. student ed. 1961)
40. Id. at 269-70.
41. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,682 n.448.
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document be drafted "accurately, clearly and concisely," 42 there is no
bright-line rule regarding the inferences that can be drawn from the
English language. A franchisor may prepare a questionable offering
circular, but consider the possibility of post hoc Commission action worth
the risk of commencing operations. Second, although the offering circular
may comply in all respects with the requirements, the franchisor may
"bury" it among other documents furnished to the prospective franchisee.
Third, the franchisor may continue to conduct a "hard sell," confining
material misrepresentations to its oral presentations. If later challenged,
the franchisor is in a position to deny that the statements were made.
Fourth, because the franchisor actively seeks out only unsophisticated
prospects,43 it is unlikely that the impact of even the honest circular's
unfavorable contents will be perceived by the franchisee until he or she has
signed the agreement.
Recognizing these limited benefits of the Rule and the administrative
limitations upon its own enforcement power, the Commission urged that
the courts accord an injured franchisee a private right of action to redress
violations of the Rule." Assuming that the courts are favorably disposed
to the Commission's suggestion, there are, nevertheless, significant
problems for a plaintiff who relies exclusively upon this implied right of
action. On the other hand, there are strong reasons for the courts to
recognize that at least some franchises are securities within the coverage of
federal securities law, and grant private relief under that well-developed
body of national antifraud law.
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT
A. Substantive Deficiencies
Franchisor abuse of the system is not a new phenomenon.
Capitalizing on the initial success of legitimate franchisors, the flimflam
artist quickly used the device to his advantage.4 5 Because of franchising's
42. Disclosure Requirements, supra note 1, at 59,614 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §436.1(a)).
43. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
44. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3. The limits on the Commission's
enforcement power are both practical and procedural. First, because the Commission does not have a
prior review capability, notice of any violations of the Rule must come from injured franchisees,
followed by Commission investigation. Second, even if the Commission concludes that a franchisoris
violating the Rule, there are procedural limits on its powers. Before issuing a cease and desist order, the
Commission must conduct an adjudicatory proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976). The franchisor may
further delay enforcement by filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals. 15
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976). Penalties do not begin accruing, in the case of a contested order, until time for
review by petition of certiorari have expired. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1976).
45.
The ingenious marketing and distribution device of franchising, that extraordinary symbiosis
of big and small business, so necessary in the current age of gargantuan public corporations
and turbulent, urbanized, untrained and unskilled ethnic minorities, has also attracted the
promotional fermentations of unscrupulous or shortsighted enterpreneurs. We have, at best,
confusion, and, at worst, deceit or misrepresentation, in the purposes, goals and actions of
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unique characteristics as a hybrid business form46 and the interstate
character of the offerings, however, the common law proved ineffective
against the problems created by franchisor abuse.47
Two substantive barriers of the common law have defeated franchisee
fraud actions. First, franchisor offerings rely heavily upon income
projections for potential units. The franchisee who is induced to enter an
agreement in reliance upon the projections later finds that they are not
actionable, no matter how distorted. Under state law of fraud, such
representations are merely "trade talk" or "dealer's talk"-not fact.48
Second, what the franchisor omits to say about the offering often is
more critical to the offeree than what is said. But the courts have held that
nondisclosure is not actionable absent some special relationship between
offeror and offeree.49 Moreover, courts have held that fiduciary status
giving rise to a duty to speak is not generally present in a franchise
relationship.50
Franchisees have turned for relief to federal forums under two bodies
of law. First, franchisees have obtained some relief under the antitrust
laws, although the application is limited.5' Second, federal securities
antifraud laws offer a range of remedies for the kind of manipulative
practices endemic to franchise offerings.52 The course of franchise
securities litigation is examined in the third part of this comment. It is
appropriate at this point, however, to develop securities law antifraud
those franchisors who prefer to get rich quickly at the expense of their franchisees or
stockholders, instead of organizing and building a long term sound business for the benefit of
all concerned. That is why the public interest has become paramount, requiring full disclosure
to prevent fraud and manipulation.
Goodwin, supra note 7, at 1403 (citations omitted).
46. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,698.
47.
Common law fraud and state antifraud statutes are so beclouded by vestigial variations,
straightjackets and anachronistic requirements, rarely compatible with the complex
manipulations of business today, that they have become an obstacle course hindrance rather
than a help to plaintifis involved with the intracacies and imaginative devices of modern
business operators and entreprenuers [sic], especially if they operate interstate rather than
intrastate.
Goodwin, supra note 7, at 1413.
48. See cases discussed in Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 6, 28 (1975) (discussing fraud associated with
franchise and distributing relationships).
49. Id. at 23-26.
50. See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: A TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 41 (1969). But see Broomfield v.
Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc, 2d 392, 339
N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1972), affd, 77 Misc. 2d 962, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 589 (App. Term. 1974), rev'd, 40
N.Y.2d 936, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57, 358 N.E.2d 882 (1976).
51. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd 332 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
381 U.S. 125 (1964).
52. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976)(express civil action for false registration statement), §
771(2)(express civil action for misleading statements), § 77o (liabilities of controlling persons), § 77q
(implied right of action for fraud), § 78j(6) & SEC Rule X-10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 0(b)(5)(b) (1978)(implied right of action forfraud); 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976) (implied right ofaction for violation of proxy
rules).
FRANCHISING
measures vis-a-vis the Commission's suggested remedy under section 5 of
the FTC Act.
The salient feature of the securities antifraud law is its flexibility. The
courts have consistently recognized the remedial nature of the statutes
53
and thus have been liberal in their construction. 54 Private plaintiffs are
generally free of the proof problems imposed by the common law. For
example, in an action brought against a seller of securities under section
12(2) of the Securities Act,55 the plaintiff need only prove that the seller
made a material misstatement or omission, or created a "half-truth," in
order to obtain rescission. Proof of scienter is not required; the plaintiff is
relieved of the common law obligation of reasonable care. Furthermore,
the plaintiff need not prove that he relied upon the misstatements or
omissions.5 6 Moreover, the defendant is denied the defenses of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk.57 Although it is now
settled that some elements of fraud are a necessary58 part of an action
brought pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
10(b)-5,5 9 the plaintiff proceeding under those provisions may reach parties
not within the scope of section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.60 In short,
the federal securities antifraud law has devloped a tightly-woven web in
which a plaintiff may find the strand suited to the injury that he or she has
suffered.
The franchisee-plaintiff who attempts to exercise a private right of
action under section 5 of the FTC Act will face significant substantive
barriers. Foremost among these are: (1) the reluctance of the courts to
recognize a private right of action under that section; (2) the complete
absence of a substantive body of law applicable to the franchise
relationship; and (3) the limitation of liability granted to directors and
controlling shareholders of franchisors.
First, the federal courts have consistently held that a private right of
action cannot be implied from the FTC Act.61 The courts may now reverse
themselves, but franchisors have a powerful argument that if a private
right is to be granted, it is Congress, and not the Commission, that wields
the authority. Moreover, the federal courts are engaged in what one
53. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
54. Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
56. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1222 (D. Md. 1968). aff'dinpart,422
F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
57. Id., 297 F. Supp. at 1221-22.
58. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1976); SEC Rule X-10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(bX5X(b) (1978).
60. Section 12 liabilities attach only to the plaintiffs seller, but privity is not a requirement of
Rule 10(b)-5. Moreover, sellers as well as purchasers may sue under Rule 10(b)-S.
61. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); butsee Guernsey
v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
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observer terms a "quasi-counterrevolution, 6 2 reversing a long period
during which implied rights of action were freely recognized. Whether or
not the courts are disposed to adopt the Commission's conclusions,
franchisees clearly face expensive legal battles to avoid dismissal for failure
to state cognizable claims.
Second, no body of substantive decisions applicable to the franchisor-
franchisee arrangement now exists under the FTC Act. It is therefore an
open question whether the courts will require proof of fraud or merely
negligence for private recovery under section 5. The Commission spoke to
this issue in discussing the legal standards that it will follow in its
enforcement activities: "The resulting legal standard is clear and direct: A
seller's claim or representation violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act if it has a tendency to deceive the consumer in any
particular which could reasonably influence the latter's buying choice."63
Under this test, proof of reliance is not required,64 nor is the intent of the
franchisor material. 65 Moreover, deceptiveness is proved by the "substan-
tial capacity or tendency to deceive," not actual deception.66 The
Commission's test clearly would impose liability for negligent mis-
statements and omissions. The courts may be inclined to agree.
Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act declares that unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce are unlawful.67 In the context of misleading
advertising and labelling, the courts have upheld Commission deter-
minations of unfairness and deception without a showing of elaborate
proof. 68 To require the Commission to show consumer reliance upon the
deceptive contents would clearly thwart the mission of protection, for the
expense of gathering such evidence would be prohibitive.
It remains to be seen, however, if the standard proposed to be applied
in administrative actions will be carried over to private civil suits. In
private franchise litigation, unlike injunctive FTC action, the plaintiff
normally will seek rescission of the agreement and restitution of fees paid.
With respect to remedies, private franchise litigation thus seems more
closely related to private litigation under the securities laws than to
administrative action by the FTC. This relationship is underscored by the
fact that the language of the Rule clearly is drawn heavily from section 12
62. Unpublished lecture of Prof. Morgan Shipman, The Ohio State University College of Law,
Jan. 23, 1979. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) marks the opening of this counterrevolution. In Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a defeated
tender offeror had no cause of action under either § 14(e) of the Williams Act (15 U.S.C. § 78n(c)
(1976)) or section 10(b) against a rival successful tender offeror. The trend is clearly to limit private
rights of action to those expressly granted by Congress.
63. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,631.
64. Id.
65. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967).
66. Id. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,631.
67. 45 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
68. See Montgomery Ward Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967).
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of the Securities Act, which accords the remedy of rescission upon a
showing of mere negligence. The difficulty is that section 5 of the FTC Act,
which authorizes the Rule, reads more like section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act than like section 12 of the Securities Act. The Supreme
Court has held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder6 9 that a private civil recovery
under section 10(b), which prohibits manipulation and deception in
securities transactions, can be had only upon proof of scienter.70 The
discrepancy between the language of the franchise Rule and the language
of section 5 of the FTC Act combines with the dissimilarity between
administrative enforcement and private litigation to present the courts
with a difficult question: must private franchise plaintiffs show scienter to
recover, or will a showing of negligence suffice?
A third significant problem for plaintiffs is that "controlling persons"
of the franchisor are exempted from secondary liability for violations of
the Rule.71 Although it expressly adopts the securities law definition of
"affiliated person" for purposes of disclosure,72 the Commission
inexplicably limits liability for material misrepresentations and omissions
to the franchisor alone. This omission is especially puzzling in light of the
reach of securities law with regard to "insiders" and controlling persons.
Section 15 of the Securities Act73 imposes joint and several liability upon
controlling persons, and liability under section 10(b)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act extends to those who "aid and abet" securities fraud. 4
Section 15 was enacted to "supplement, and extend beyond, common
law principles of agency and respondeat superior."75 Moreover, the
controlling person cannot escape liability by proving that it acted in good
faith, or did not directly or indirectly induce the violation.76 Not only has
the imposition of controlling-person liability eased the plaintiff's burden of
pro of,7 7 it has promoted the underlying objective of investor protection by
requiring a high standard of care in the directors' activities relative to
securities matters.78
It thus appears that, by specifically excluding controlling persons
from the reach of the Rule, the Commission has relegated plaintiffs to the
common-law doctrine that directors and controlling shareholders of a
corporation can be held personally liable to third persons only for
69. 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
70. Id. at 214.
71. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,716 n.166.
72. Disclosure Requirements, supra note 1, at 59,620 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(i)).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
74. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974).
75. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212 (D. Md. 1968), aff'dlnpart,422
F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
76. Id., 297 F. Supp. at 1213.
77. See id.
78. See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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corporate fraud in which they directly participated.79 This standard is
incompatible with the underlying purposes of the Rule, which is
protection of the investor. Once again, it is open to question whether the
courts will follow the Commission's lead.
B. Conflicts Between Coverage of Section 5
and the United States Arbitration Act
Even assuming that the foregoing problems can be resolved, the
courts must still face a more basic problem-the reconciliation of the two
competing federal policies. Virtually all contemporary franchise
agreements contain broad contractual arbitration provisions. The United
States Arbitration Act 0 extinguished a longstanding judicial disapproval
of contractual arbitration provisions, directing that such agreements are
specifically enforceable in the federal courts.8' Section 3 of the Act confers
primary jurisdiction over contract disputes to the arbitrator, and allows
jurisdiction of the courts only to the extent necessary to determine the
arbitrability of the issues before it.$2 Furthermore, any party to a contract
has a specific right to petition the district court for an order compelling
arbitration. 3
The enormous impact that the Arbitration Act has had upon federal
court jurisdiction of commercial disputes in general, and franchisee claims
in particular, resulted from the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Concklin Manufacturing Co. 4 Prima Paint
had purchased Flood & Concklin's (F&C) paint business and entered into
a long-term contract for the consulting services of F&C's president. The
agreement contained a "broad" arbitration clause.8 Shortly thereafter,
F&C filed a petition in bankruptcy. Prima Paint then filed suit in federal
district court against F&C, alleging that it was induced to enter into the
agreements by F&C's fraudulent representation of solvency and
seeking rescission of both contracts.8 6 F&C moved pursuant to the
Arbitration Act for a stay pending arbitration of Prima Paint's claims. The
district court granted the stay.8 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that:
Under § 4, with respect to a matter within thejurisdiction of the federal courts
save for the existence of an arbitration clause, the federal court is instructed to
79. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1137 & 1143 (rev.
perm. ed. 1975).
80. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
81. See Albatross S.S. Co. v. Manning Bros., 95 F. Supp. 459 (SD.N.Y. 1951).
82. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
83. Id. § 4.
84. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
85. Id. at 398.




order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that "the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration
agreement] is not in issue." Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes to the
"making" of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to
consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally38
Because the franchise agreement involves transactions "in commerce"
and ordinarily contains an arbitration provision like that of Prima Paint, it
is clear that the Arbitration Act governs these types of arrangements.
Considering that the new Rule proscribes conduct with the attributes of
fraudulent inducement, the courts must initially determine if the
Arbitration Act limits jurisdiction over the franchisee's section 5 claims-
jurisdiction that they would otherwise be free to exercise fully.
In the arena of securities fraud litigation, the Supreme Court, in
Wilko v. Swann,"9 held that the Arbitration Act did not limit jurisdiction
over claims sought to be asserted under section 12 of the Securities Act.
The Court's analysis suggests, however, that the courts will have significant
difficulty in obtaining the same results in a section 5 case. In Wilko, a
customer brought suit against his brokerage firm under section 12(2) of
the Securities Act, alleging that the firm's false representations induced
him to purchase stock.90 Without answering, the firm moved for a stay
pending arbitration of the dispute pursuant to a clause in the parties'
margin agreements. 9' Holding that "the agreement to arbitrate deprived
the petitioner of the advantageous court remedy afforded by the Securities
Act . . . ,,92 the district court denied the motion.
The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the agreement
constituted a waiver, impermissible under section 14 , of the plaintiff's
right to select a judicial forum for resolution of section 12 claims. The
Court stated that "[t]his arrangement to arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we
think the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that
cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act."94 It concluded that: "As
the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of
judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that
Congress must have intended § 14 . .. to apply to waiver ofjudicial trial
and review., 95 Thus, the Securities Act provided two bases upon which the
88. Id. at 403-04 (citations omitted).
89. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
90. Id. at 428-29.
91. Id. at 429.
92. Id. at 430.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976) provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapterorof the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
94. 346 U.S. at 434-35.
95. Id. at 437 (citation omitted).
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Wilko Court anchored its analysis: first, the express right of action (under
section 12) and the forum selection grant provided by section 22(a);96 and
second, the express prohibition against waiver found in section 14.
The scheme of section 5 of the FTC Act utterly fails to supply the basis
for an analysis like that of Wilko. Hence, it is possible that the implied right
granted under section 5 may be effectively extinguished by franchisors who
invoke sections 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act. But whatever the resolution
of this question, franchisee-plaintiffs face expensive and time-consuming
litigation over this issue at the procedural level before they can go to trial
on the merits.
In summary, the Commission realizes that the Rule cannot effectively
end abuse in the offering and sale of franchises without the sanctions of a
private civil remedy. But the only remedy that the Commission can suggest
is fraught with procedural and substantive barriers for admittedly
underfinanced franchises.
This Comment has suggested that, given the recognition that
franchises are "strikingly similar" to traditional securities,97 the interests of
both private plaintiffs and judicial economy would be served by direct
application of federal securities antifraud laws to the problem of abuse in
that arena. The writer will now examine the court's historically rigid
treatment of franchise security litigation and suggest a reasonable test for
determining whether a particular offering represents a security.
III. THE FRANCHISE AS A SECURITY
A. The Investment Contract
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act98 defines a "security" as, inter alia, an
"investment contract." That the reach of the Act extends far beyond
instruments such as stocks and bonds is evident, for "security" was further
defined in the same section to include "in general, any instrument or
interest commonly known as a 'security.' ,99 Congress intended by this
language to provide flexibility to the Act, and encompass devices that
would, in the future, come to be regarded as investments. Thus, the
Supreme Court, in its initial consideration of this language in SECv. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp.00 asserted that:
[T]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt
in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976) (prohibiting removal of an action brought in state court under
§12).
97. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,699.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
99. Id.
100. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
101. Id. at 351.
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commerce as "investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security.' t0
In Joiner, the Court applied the Securities Act to a scheme in which the
defendant raised capital for drilling an exploratory oil well by offering
adjacent parcels of its lease for as little as $5.00 per parcel.
Three years later, in SEC v. W.J. Hoivey Co., 10 2 the Court refined its
application of the "investment contract" language. In Howey, the
defendant was offering Florida citrus groves to out-of-state professionals
who wintered in that state. It was not this aspect of the sale alone that the
Court found objectionable, however, but the contemporaneous offering of
a "service contract."' 0 3 This service contract, which the buyer was free to
accept or reject, gave the defendant absolute control over the citrus crop,
entitling the buyer to receive an allocation of annual net profits.101 The
Court first determined that:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the pro-
moter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise
are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical
assets employed in the enterprise. 0 5
It held that "[t]he investment contracts in this instance take the form of
land sales contracts, warranty deeds and service contracts which
respondents offer to prospective investors."' 0 6
The Supreme Court later mandated that "in searching for the
meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality."'1 7 The apparent flexibility embodied in this passage is sharply
curtailed, however, by the legal strictures found in the Howey Court's
"solely through the efforts of others" language. Indeed, although a
franchise security case has never been decided by the Supreme Court, the
lower courts have applied the Howey test with a vengeance in the context
of conventional franchise litigation. Just how the courts have distin-
guished conventional from unconventional franchises, and found the
latter subject to the sanctions of the securities law, is the beginning point
for any analysis of this area.
B. Franchise Security Litigation
1. The Conventional Franchise
The franchising "boom" that began in the '60s"° marked the
102. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
103. Id. at 296.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 298-99.
106. Id. at 300.
107. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
108. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,623.
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beginning of efforts by franchisees to obtain a nationwide remedy for a
national problem. They quite naturally turned to federal securities
antifraud laws; all sought at the threshold to have their agreements
declared to be investment contracts. Every attempt thus far has failed.'
The dismissals have come at the jurisdictional level, for lack of a
federal question. It is clear that the Howey test requires the plaintiff to
prove three elements- (1) an investment or "initial value," (2) a common
enterprise, and (3) that the plaintiff was led to believe that profits would
result solely from the efforts of others. In the context of franchise litigation
the Howey test has been interpreted as subjective, and judicial inquiry has
been directed to whether the plaintiff believed, when he paid over his
money, that someone else would be using managerial and enterpreneurial
skills to produce a profit. The first two elements of the test have presented
little problem to the plaintiffs," 0 but the third element has uniformly
proved to be the stumbling block.
The courts have first engaged in a brief examination of the franchise
documents in order to determine what the franchisee should "reasonably"
have believed were his obligations under the agreement."1 Second, they
have turned their attention to the franchisee's actual expectations. 112
Finally, the courts have read the "solely through the efforts of others"
language with such literalness that no conventional franchise can pass
muster. Even in the cases of "turn key" franchises,1 3 in which franchisee
109. See, e.g., Crowley v. Montgomery Ward& Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 877(10thCir. 1978); Lino v,
City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1973); Nash & Assoc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392
(6th Cir. 1973); Plum Tree, Inc., v. Frasz, 433 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa, 1977); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Seligson,
383 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fil.
1972).
110. See Los Angeles Trust Deed and Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1962), in which the court of appeals stated that "a common enterprise is one in
which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of
those seeking the investment of third parties." Id. at 172. This definition is little more than surplusage to
the third element of Howey, because if the investor depends upon the efforts of others, then the third
element is necessarily met. Therein appears to lie the reason why the courts have uniformly presumed a
common enterprise and concentrated on Howey's third element.
Ill. See, e.g., Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978); Chapman v.
Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
112. Consider this excerpt from the trial court transcript in Chapman, 409 F.2d at 640 n.3
(emphasis added):
Q ***Did you consider when you make [sic] your payment to Rudd Paint that you had made an
investment such as you might make in General Motors or Ameri-an Telephone & Telegraph?
A No sir ...
Q In this instance, you recognized that the success or failure of the sales of Run Guard in Colorado
were primarily dependent upon your efforts, isn't that correct?
A Combined efforts of the company, with their cooperation, and myself, yes.
Q That is correct. And you were mindful of the provision in Paragraph XXI of the agreement,
. . . which says, 'Distributor understands and agrees that the success of this distributorship Is
directly related to the efforts of the distributor, and therefore no guarantees of sales profit or
volume can be made.'
A That is true.
Q You understood that when you entered into the agreement?
A Yes.
113. A "turn key" operation is one in which the franchisor assumes responsibility for all phases
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control is virtually nonexistent, franchisees have failed to meet Howey's
third element.1 4 A reading of many cases indicates that franchisors may
escape liability merely by inserting provisions designating the franchisee
an independent contractor and obligating it to pay expenses." 5
2. The Unconventional Franchise
The analysis employed in the conventional franchise cases differs
sharply, however, from that applied to litigation concerning the
unconventional franchise. Unconventional franchises comprise a group of
schemes generally known as pyramid sales plans, founders' contracts and
referral schemes 1 6 The salient feature of all unconventional franchise
devices, but especially of the pyramid sales plan, is that the buyer is led to
believe that he or she can get rich quickly by convincing other prospects to
buy the plan. Although these schemes flourished in the "boomtown"
atmosphere of the last decade, the most prominent ones have been
extinguished by federal injunctive actions brought by the SEC and by state
legislation outlawing pyramid plans.' 1 7
The two leading cases are SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.118 and
SECv. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.119 Inboth cases, thegovernment
contended that the plans were investment contracts, and sought
injunctions against any offering prior to registration with the SEC. As in
the cases of conventional franchises, the battle centered around the third
element of the Howey test.
In Turner, the court quickly disposed of Howey's first two elements. 120
of development and construction of the franchisee's unit, and retains virtually complete control over
financial and other aspects of the unit after operation has commenced. Thus, the franchisee need only
"turn the key" to be in business. This, incidently, is all the franchisee has the right to do under the
agreement.
114. See, e.g., Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. RiverCity
Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'don conmzon law grounds, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972).
115. See Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
116. A pyramid sales plan is a multi-level "distributorship" scheme in which the prospect pays a
fee to the parent company that entitles him to sell distributorships to other prospects. At the end ofthe
distributorship chain are those who for a nominal fee may distribute the parent company's product.
The primary emphasis, however, is not upon the sale of the product, but upon the sale of more
distributorships, which mathematically "pyramids" the organization to infinity. For a specific
discussion of the sales scheme, see Note, Dare To Be Great, Inc.!:A Case Stud, of 'ramd Sales Plan
Regulation, 33 OHIo STATE L. J. 676 (1972).
Founders' contracts are similar. The parent company proposes to establish a retail department
store in which only "members" may shop. Once a prospect becomes a member, he has the right to sell
further memberships, from which he received "commissions" on each sale. See Hawvaiiv. Hawaii Mkt.
Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642,485 P.2d 105 (1971). Another form of the founders' contract isthe referral
scheme in which a consumer buys a product at an exorbitant price and receives a fee from the seller for
every successful sale made thereafter to customers "referred" by the buyer. See Emery v. So-Soft of
Ohio, Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E. 2d 120 (1964).
117. Typical of these statutes is the Ohio pyramid sales plan or program law, OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 1333.91-.96 (Page Supp. 1978).
118. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
119. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 821
(1973).
120. 474 F.2d at 481.
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But the court was faced with the problem that the franchisee actually
expended effort in canvassing for more prospects, selling the plan and
conducting prospects to the franchisor's meetings.' 21 The court had no
difficulty in rejecting Howey's third element for a more realistic test:
"whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise."12 2 Applying this test, the court had
no difficulty in finding the plan in Turner to be an investment contract.
Koscot elaborated upon Turner's theme. Meticulously analyzing the
franchisee's obligations, the court found that the franchisee was " to lure
prospects to meetings,"'2' after which his role was "little more than a
perfunctory one."'' 24 That the franschisee actually closed sales of the
distributorships did not impress the court. This act was, in the court's
view, "essentially a ministerial . . . one."'125 It followed Turner's test. 12 6
The court reversed the court below, which had refused to enjoin offers of
the plan without prior registration. 27
It is clear that the Turner-Koscot test significantly extends the reach of
Howey. First, it objectifies the third element of the latter by focusing the
inquiry not on the "reasonable belief' of the prospect, but upon an
objective post hoc evaluation of the actual duties performed. Second, it
strikes out the "solely through the efforts of others" language and inserts
instead a qualitative analysis.
The potential application of this test at least to conventional "turn
key" franchises is obvious. But the courts have expressly limited its
application to cases that deal with unconventional fianchises. 12 8 Koscot
imposed this limit by stating that:
We confine our holding to those schemes in which promoters retain
immediate control over the essential managerial conduct of an enterprise and
121. Id. at 482.
122. Id.
123. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 1974).
124. Id. at 485.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 483.
127. Id. at 486. In United Hous. Found'n v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,852 n.16 (1975), the Supreme
Court specifically withheld judgment on the Turner-Koscot test, although the Court reaffirmed Howey
in litigation not concerning franchises.
Prior to Forman, two courts had expressed approval in dicta of the "risk-capital" test. Nash &
Assoc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640,646 (D. Colo 1970). This test has taken two forms. Compare Hawaii v. Hawaii
Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971) with Sobieski v. Silver Hills Country Club, 55
Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961). Both focus upon the character of the franchisee's
investment in the hands of the franchisor. If part of the investment becomes risk capital of the
franchisor, quite likely a security will be found. The reaffirmation of How.v, in Forman, coupled with
the specific footnote reference to the Turner-Koscot test and omission of any reference to the risk-
capital test, indicates that the latter test will not be a factor in further federal franchise litigation,
128. See In re Bestline Prods. Sec. and Antitrust Litigation, 412 F. Supp. 732, 751-52 (S.D. Fll,
1976); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 645 (D. Colo. 1970).
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where the investor's realization of profits is inextricably tied to the success of
the promotional scheme. Thus, we acknowledge that a conventional
franchise arrangement, wherein the promoter exercises merely remote
control over an enterprise and the investor operates largely unfetterd by
promoter mandates presents a different question than the one posed herein.
But the Koscot scheme does not qualify as a conventional franchising
arrangement. 129
The courts have thus based the discriminatory treatment of
conventional franchises entirely on the premise that the franchisee retains
such control over his operation that "the [franchised] enterprise stands or
falls independently of the [franchisor's] success or failure."'130 In short, the
courts believe that "the franchisee's risk is not sufficiently integrated with
that of the franchisor to bring such franchises within the scope of the
Federal securities laws."'13 The Commission's findings, however, confirm
that the courts are in error.
IV. UTILITY OF THE RULE
A. Integration of Risks in the Conventional Franchise
The primary utility of the new Rule is that the extensive findings upon
which it is based amply discredit the myth that the franchisee's risk is
independent of the franchisor's. In its description of the general
characteristics of franchising, developed from a record of 30,000 pages, 3 2
the Commission concluded that:
These three distinct conceptual characteristics of franchising-increased
potential for success, loss of independence, and a payment of capital to the
franchisor by the franchisee-are characteristics which make entering into a
franchise strikingly similar to the purchase of a security. The attraction of
securities and franchising is the same: a promise of a substantial return on
capital investment. 1
33
Although the Commission acknowledged a "significant difference
between a franchise and a security"'134 in that the franchisee contributes
labor as well as capital, 135 it never questioned the conclusion of Professor
Urband B. Ozanne that
[t]he franchisee depends upon the business expertise of the franchisor. In fact,
the franchisee gives up substantial control over elements of his business
operation to the franchisor. The franchise relationship assumes that the
franchisee knows little or nothing about site selection, market conditions,
work layout, product mix, business management, and the many other
129. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 476,485 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
130. Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
131. In re Bestline Prods. See. and Antitrust Litigation, 412 F. Supp. 732, 751 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
132. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 3, at 59,622.
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ingredients in a successful franchise. Because of the level of control exerted
by the franchisor, the success or failure of the franchisee depends on the
competence, judgment and financial soundness of the franchisor" 6
There could be no clearer statement of the integration of risk between
franchisor and franchisee. This conclusion, which provided the basis for
the Rule's requirement of disclosure of the business experience of the
franchisor's officers and directors, 13 confirms the view of the overwhelm-
ing number of commentators who have considered franchising's
integration of risk.
138
In light of the Commission's persuasive findings and conclusions, the
courts should now discard the judicial presumption that the franchisee
stands independent of the franchisor's success or failure. The courts might
fashion a test, along the lines of Turner-Koscot, that takes into account the
practical realities of franchising. Such a test might be articulated as
follows:
Given all the facts concerning the franchisor claims and its true financial
condition, and given the economic reality of the franchisee-franchisor
relationship, would a reasonably prudent investor expect his success to
depend significantly upon the entrepreneurial and managerial skills of the
franchisor?
The courts could adopt another course, however, and recognize that
franchises have come to be, "in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security.' ,,9 This would open the way for the
holding that conventional franchises evidenced by written instruments
(which are covered by the Rule) are securities. This course is clearly
preferable to the application of the suggested test on a. case-by-case basis.
First, it would allow franchisors the certainty that their offerings are
subject to at least the antifraud provisions of federal securities law. Sec-
ond, it would enable the trial court to dispense with a protracted examina-
tion of the franchisor's offering at a pretrial stage. The only preliminary
question would be whether the offering fell within the ambit of the Com-
mission's Rule.
The franchisors need not be concerned with an onerous burden of
registration with the SEC in addition to compliance with the Com-
mission's Rule. The SEC, pursuant to its plenary power under section 3(b)
136. Id. at 59,640.
137. Disclosure Requirements, supra note l,at59,614(tobecodificd in 16 C.F.R. §436.1(a)(2)),
138. See, e.g., Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of
1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising Law Matures, 28 Bus. LAW. 703 (1973);
Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as A Security Under Securities
Acts, Including l0b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1969); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance
of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTIN " L.J. 219 (1975); Note, The
Franchise As a Security: Application of the Securities Laws to Owner-Operated Franchises, II 1B.C,
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 228 (1970).
139. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
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of the Securities Act,140 would no doubt move quickly to create an
exemption. Since its exemption power applies to aggregate offerings up to
$1,500,000, franchises clearly would be relieved of any registration
requirements.
B. Impact Upon State Case Law
The Commission's Rule has an important secondary utility-its
impact upon franchise fraud litigation at the state level. First, the
evidentiary importance of having many franchisor representations in
writing cannot be underestimated. Second, and more important, state
courts should be willing to relax the anachronistic common-law proof
requirements when the franchisor has assumed a higher standard of care
under federal laws. For example, it has already been stated that projections
of income (no matter how distorted) are not actionable misrepresentations
under the common law. 14 By contrast, section 5 is violated when the
franchisor makes such projections without a reasonable basis in fact upon
which to support them. 42 The franchisor, by commencing an offering,
impliedly asserts to prospective franchisees that it has assumed a high
standard of care in preparing the offering circular and making its oral
presentations. The state courts could, and should, adopt the position that
this implied assertion creates a special duty to the prospect under state
common law. Given this fiduciary-like relationship, distorted income
projections in violation of the Rule should be actionable under common-
law theories of fraud.
43
V. CONCLUSION
The new FTC Rule concerning disclosure requirements and
prohibitions in the offer and sale of franchises will affect franchisor abuse
in three ways. First, the disclosures themselves will have a deterrent effect
at the point of sale. Second, there is some hope that courts will follow the
suggestion of the Commission and recognize an implied right of action
under section 5 of the FTC Act. This possibility presents serious sub-
stantive and procedural problems. Third, and most important, the
record produced by the Commission destroys the long-held judicial
presumption that a franchise is fundamentally unlike a security. The
policies underlying the Rule and the securities law are indistinguishable.
Moreover, every franchise presents the potential for full integration of risk
between franchisor and franchisee. This removes the lynchpin of prior case
140. Id. § 77c (b).
141. See notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
143. Hence, omissions and half-truths in the offering of franchises would also be actionable. See
notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
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law, which has arbitrarily distinguished conventional from unconven-
tional franchises. Therefore, the courts should acknowledge economic
realities in the determination of franchise litigation.
Michael G. Moore
